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Introduction 
In an article published in the online Daily Times edition of 28 July 2012, 
the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Malawi (UNIMA), Professor 
Emmanuel Fabiano is credited with a call to Malawians to engage in a 
‘reasoned, open and fact-based discussion’ on access to third level 
education generally, and in particular, on the University Quota System 
Policy (the UQS). I am delighted to respond to Professor Fabiano’s 
challenge. The previous Government implemented the UQS and 
rationalised it as a tool for ‘equal access’ to, and for addressing ‘under 
representation’ in, public universities. We were informed that some groups 
experience difficulty accessing public universities and are consequently 
under represented. The UQS is intended to be an affirmative action policy 
and Section 20(2) of the Constitution does authorise affirmative action 
assuming certain conditions are met. Media reports suggest that the UQS 
Policy allocates and guarantees a specified number of places in publicly 
funded universities (assuming the merit criteria is met), and the 
‘remaining (unfilled) places are allocated on the basis of a district’s 
population size and set criteria. Failure by a district to meet its quota will 
result in the quota being shared by neighbouring districts located in the 
same region as the failing district. The article is essentially an evaluation 
of the implementation of the UQS Policy. 
Furthermore, the previous head of state charged, on record, that some 
groups cheat their way into public universities. It is not clear whether the 
alleged cheating causes the access difficulties, and ultimately, the under 
representation. The UQS, it appears, identifies those with access problems 
as all Malawians excluding Northern Malawians. The allegation of fraud 
strongly suggests the fraudsters are exclusively Northern Malawians. It 
also seems that the regional and district divide which anchors the UQS 
Policy is used by it as a code for ethnicity. Although Section 20(2) does 
anticipate affirmative action measures the operation of the UQS raises 
serious doubts about its constitutionality.  
Equality as a Prescriptive Value 
Equality is an important public value, and also a standard against which 
public or private conduct can be measured and ultimately declared 
acceptable or not. Equality in this sense is prescriptive and is crystalised in 
the Constitution and written laws of Parliament. In this way, the 
Constitution and the laws of Parliament indicate what the constitutional 
policy and a government’s public policy positions on a specific equality 
concern are or ought to be. Therefore, constitutional provisions, the laws 
of Parliament and public policy directives are coercive tools a government 
will use to extend entitlements or withdraw privileges for the benefit or to 
the disadvantage, respectively, of specific groups in society. Significantly, 
the design of a public policy implementing mechanism must be sound 
because it is at the point of implementation that a public policy actually 
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touches the lives of people in real and significant ways. At this point, the 
tensions, dilemmas and contradictions embodied in the policy get into 
contact with the Constitution. In the following section I will suggest that 
the means for putting into practice a public policy preference, and in this 
case the UQS, ought to be, constitutionally, sound. 
Implementation of Policy 
This concern has both procedural and substantive aspects. Procedurally, 
the issue is whether the means for putting into practical operation the 
UQS conforms to the requirements of the Constitution. Substantively, the 
issue is whether the type of equality remedy in the in the UQS, and the 
design of the remedy, coincide with the type of equality remedies and the 
design of policies envisioned by the Constitution. Failure to take into 
account these concerns has the potential to derail the implementation of 
the UQS on the basis that it is unconstitutional. The implementation of 
equality, its meaning, its function and also its scope will to a large extent 
depend on the specific words used in the relevant constitutional provision. 
The Constitution uses the concept of non-discrimination in order to 
advance its equality agenda but it does not define it. A helpful definition of 
discrimination is provided by the Supreme Court of Canada. Discrimination 
may be understood as ‘a distinction, intentional or otherwise, which 
involves prejudice or imposes disadvantage. The distinction, must, relate 
to personal characteristics; impose burdens, obligations, or disadvantages 
on an individual or a group which are not imposed on another individual or 
group. Alternatively, the distinction must effectively withhold or limit 
access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages on an individual or a 
group which are available to another individual or group. A distinction 
made on the basis of an individual's merits and capacities will rarely be 
characterised as discrimination.’ What follows next is an explanation of the 
content of Section 20 of the Constitution and an evaluation of the 
implementation of the UQS on the basis of the Constitution. 
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Section 20 of the Constitution on Equality  
Section 20 (1) lists prohibited grounds of discrimination but impliedly it 
also has grounds that are non-listed (analogous grounds). The wrong that 
Section 20(1) seeks to address is illegal or unfair discrimination. Section 
20(1) in part reads ‘…all persons are, under any law, guaranteed equal 
and effective protection against discrimination…’ The phrase ‘under the 
law’ requires that ‘equals should be treated equally’; people in a similar 
position ought to be treated in the same way. The phrase also requires 
that unequals should be treated unequally; those in a different position 
ought to be treated differently.  
Section 20 (2) permits a government to eliminate inequality by extending 
opportunities, benefits or advantages to one group and at the same time 
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withholding or limiting the same from others. This implies that 
discrimination, may, in some cases be legal and this is also called 
affirmative action. Affirmative action is, in many respects, the essence of 
substantive equality which may justify treating an individual or a group 
more favourably than another individual or group because the targeted 
beneficiary individual or group comparably has less resources or 
advantages than another individual or group. The UQS claims to do this. 
The next section addresses the nature of equality envisioned in Section 
20(2).  
The Nature of Equality in Section 20(2)  
An affirmative action measure rolled under Section 20(2) may be 
explained as the extension to a member of a particular group of 
opportunities, benefits or advantages denied to a member belonging to 
another group, in order to eliminate inequality, so long as it is established 
that unequal or unjustifiable discriminatory treatment is the cause of the 
lack of opportunities, benefits or advantages. Consequently, an affirmative 
action measure must comply with the discrimination test and also other 
tests required under Section 44 of the Constitution collectively referred to 
as the proportionality test.  
An affirmative action measure must establish that because an individual 
belongs to a particular group, the individual is then subjected to 
unjustifiable discriminatory treatment which results in a specific 
inequality. It simply is not enough to show that an individual belongs to a 
particular group which lacks an opportunity, a benefit or an advantage 
and to use this fact alone, as a basis for extending the opportunity, 
benefit or advantage while denying others the same. Secondly, an 
affirmative action policy must show that the remedy chosen must have a 
‘real and relevant’ link to the objective of the policy in question. For 
instance, a government is justified in giving women maternity leave and 
denying men the same because there is a real and relevant difference 
between women and men that justifies the different treatment. Women 
are biologically different from men; women do fall pregnant and men do 
not. The objective of the maternity policy is to allow women to have 
babies, and also, to ensure that women maintain their employment when 
they temporarily withdraw from their employment during their maternity 
leave and the remedy is maternity leave.  
Thirdly, the UQS is also required that it does not unnecessarily limit the 
existing rights of others. The method chosen for implementing the UQS 
must be one that impairs existing entitlements the least. Fourthly, the 
benefits that the UQS seeks to attain must be proportional to the adverse 
effects that it imposes on affected non-beneficiary groups. The question 
here is whether the UQS is using a hammer in order to crack a nut. 
Inevitably, an affirmative action measure imposes ‘burdens, obligations, 
or disadvantages’ on a non-benefiting or non-targeted individual or a 
group’, and therefore, failure to establish the tests mentioned above will 
be fatal to it. What follows next is an evaluation of the implementation of 
the UQS, particularly its failures, on the basis of considerations required 
under Sections 20(2) and 44 of the Constitution. 
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Applying Section 20(2) to the Implementation of the University 
Quota System Policy 
(i) The Requirement of Legislation 
Section 20 (2) expressly grants a government authority to institute 
measures, where ever it sees fit, and subject to the Constitution, that 
address past disadvantage caused by discrimination. A government is not 
obliged to do so and it retains discretion whether to create instruments 
that address inequalities. However, should a government decide to 
undertake affirmative action, Section 20 (2) insists that such a measure 
be implemented through a law passed by the Malawi Parliament. This, in 
my opinion, excludes the introduction of affirmative action measures on 
the basis of administrative instruments such as a cabinet directive. To my 
knowledge, legislation was not passed giving the previous Government 
authority to implement the UQS. This, in my opinion, means that the UQS 
is unconstitutional.  
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Applying Section 20(2) to the Implementation of the University 
Quota System Policy 
(ii) The Substantive Constitutional Issues raised by the UQS Policy 
The UQS does not appear to have established unjustifiable discrimination. 
It has no past ‘inequality’ feature that distinguishes a member of a group 
other than the beneficiary group targeted by the UQS, and who has 
similar characteristics as a member from the beneficiary group. What 
exactly is the inequality suffered in the particular situation the UQS seeks 
to address? The UQS does not appear to objectively establish that the 
prospective students from Thyolo District, on account of belonging to the 
ethnic groups of Thyolo District, have systematically been discriminated 
against, and that as result, access difficulties and under representation 
have come about. It is also not clear how the UQS deals with the ethnic 
groups in regional and district borders including the Tonga who live on 
either side of the line dividing the Districts of Nkhata-Bay and Nkhota-
kota. In the absence of the relevant distinction and discriminatory 
conduct, the UQS is engaging in unjustifiable discrimination.  
The UQS uses a flawed merit distinction as criteria for affirmative action. A 
distinction based on natural merits or capacities will not suffice. For 
example, in choosing athletes to compete in the 800 metre race at the Rio 
de Janiero 2016 Olympics, it cannot seriously be suggested that fast 
athletes begin the qualifying race 40 seconds late in order to allow the 
slower athletes to compete fairly. It would be absurd. There is a real 
chance that a prospective student or student group that meets the merit 
criteria created by the UQS in the first and subsequent rounds of place 
allocation will be denied access to third level education simply because of 
the way the Policy was designed. It is not clear how this is justified.   
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An affirmative action measure must be designed in such a way that it can 
be explained rationally; explain the link between the objective of the 
policy (access by specified groups) and the remedy given to the 
beneficiary (establishment of quotas). The allocation of university places 
on the basis of districts or regions and also the limiting of allocation of 
places to those from a neighbouring district have, in my view, no rational 
connection to the specified objective of the UQS. While its objective is 
clear, the UQS ends up limiting the access of non-targeted groups and to 
ignore members of non-targeted groups who qualify as beneficiaries.  
The UQS Policy impairs the rights of others much more than is necessary 
to accomplish the desired objective of making third level education 
accessible. What it ends up doing is to potentially impede others from 
enjoying the same access that it wants to attain. All students want to 
improve their life chances through education and they also have a 
reasonable expectation that their effort will be recognised on the basis of 
a clear and fair merit principle. This is a constitutionally protected right 
and it flows from the constitutionally guaranteed right to education. 
However, the UQS potentially impairs this reasonable expectation to a 
constitutionally unnecessary extent. For example, the operation of the 
guaranteed 10 places principle, the ‘remaining places’ principle and the 
neighbouring places principle, individually and collectively, have the real 
potential effect to withhold third level education from students who 
otherwise would be perfect candidates for such education. Put differently, 
have other ways of addressing the perceived lack of access without 
resorting to such severe withholding or limiting access to opportunities, 
benefits, and advantages of others been exhausted?  
Serious doubt also has to be raised whether there is proportionality 
between the adverse effects and the benefits of the policy measure; the 
limiting of the right of access of non-targeted groups on the one hand and 
the objective of the policy to facilitate access of targeted groups on the 
other hand. Is the price to be paid by those from whom opportunities, 
benefits, and advantages of third level education are withheld or limited, 
or on whom the burdens, obligations or disadvantages of losing third level 
education are imposed, too high a price to pay for the sake of benefiting 
the targeted groups in the manner suggested by the policy measure? In 
this respect, the UQS potentially limits entrenched constitutional 
entitlements, including the right to education. There is a generally 
recognised constitutional rule which dictates that entrenched 
constitutional entitlements ought not to be interfered unless there are 
compelling reasons. In my view, the UQS does a very poor job of 
enlightening and explaining to Malawians what the compelling reasons for 
sustaining the UQS in its current form are.   
 
